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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

LAW AND THE STABLE SELF

REBECCA HOLLANDER-BLUMOFF*
INTRODUCTION
In his Childress Lecture, john a. powell noted that Enlightenment thinking
proposed a unitary, stable, reason-based self.1 Enlightenment writers also
suggested that individuals had transparency of mind, such that they could fully
know those true and unchanging selves.2 Further, powell added, when one
views individuals as stable, rational actors with unchanging preferences and
behavior, it is easy to imagine the law largely as a backdrop against which
action occurs and is subsequently regulated.3 Professor powell argued that just
as Einstein replaced Newton with a relative rather than absolute theory of
physics, so too the time has come to reconceptualize the role of the state from a
“neutral non actor in the universe” to one in which the state has the capacity to
“change[] the . . . actions of people via laws, regulations, and agency action.”4
In reality, powell posited, individual behavior is affected directly by the actions
of the state: the structure of laws and regulations can change the way that
individuals make decisions and take action.5
At the same time, powell highlighted the Enlightenment’s extensive
reliance on scientific knowledge to structure its logic and conclusions.6
Modern psychology—relying on Enlightenment principles of scientific

* Associate Professor, Washington University Law School. Thanks to Professor Joel Goldstein
for including me in the 2009 Childress Lecture program. Thanks also to Matt Bodie, Emily
Hughes, and Molly Wilson for their thoughtful comments and suggestions.
1. john a. powell & Stephen M. Menendian, Remaking Law: Moving Beyond an
Enlightenment Jurisprudence, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1035, 1035–40 (2010). David Hume notably
wrote, “It is universally acknowledged that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men,
in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains still the same, in its principles and
operations. The same motives always produce the same actions.” DAVID HUME, An Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding, in ENQUIRIES CONCERNING THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 80, 83 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 2d ed. 1902).
2. See, e.g., 2 PETER GAY, THE SCIENCE OF FREEDOM 177 (1969); Thomas McCarthy,
Enlightenment and the Idea of Public Reason, in QUESTIONING ETHICS: CONTEMPORARY
DEBATES IN PHILOSOPHY 164, 164–65 (Richard Kearney & Mark Dooley eds., 1999).
3. powell & Menendian, supra note 1, at 1064–67.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. GAY, supra note 2, at 176; McCarthy, supra note 2, at 168, 173.
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knowledge7—has made great strides in understanding the human mind, yet one
consistent finding of psychological research is that much of our behavior and
mental processes depend on a dizzying array of contexts, situations, and
stimuli. Kurt Lewin, the founder of social psychology, suggested that all
behavior is a function of the self plus the societal situation.8 Indeed, in light of
modern research on the importance of external cues and stimuli, it is difficult
to conceptualize a completely stable, rational actor who remains constant in
her preferences and behavior across settings. The unitary, transparent, reasonbased self—the consistently rational actor of the Enlightenment—is not real.
Instead, our mental processes and behavior are adaptable, changeable, and
often context-specific.9
In this Article, I examine several findings in social psychology related to
individuals’ preferences, and I explore how those findings subvert the
Enlightenment vision of a stable and knowable self in ways that are quite
relevant to law. I first explore one well-known finding in the cognitive bias
literature, the status quo bias, and marshal some of the research suggesting
ways in which this bias may affect individuals’ behavior vis-à-vis legal
systems. Second, I discuss the potential ways in which temporal construal
research—research on the way in which individuals see things differently
depending on the time frame in which the events will occur—may relate to
legal systems. Finally, I address how well some of the fundamental premises
of our litigation system dovetail with psychological research on what
individuals want. Our civil legal system is predicated on the recovery of
money for harm done, but research suggests that money damages may be
inadequate to meet some basic human desires.
I. STATUS QUO BIAS
As Professor powell notes, the law, and the actors who create it, are a
powerful force influencing human action. Psychological research on the status
quo suggests that individuals have a strong preference for things remaining as

7. GAY, supra note 2, at 180–81; THOMAS MUNCK, THE ENLIGHTENMENT A
COMPARATIVE SOCIAL HISTORY 1721–1794, at 12, 14 (2000); Edward E. Jones, Major
Developments in Five Decades of Social Psychology, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 16–17 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al., eds., 4th ed. 1998).
8. Lewin developed the concept of the “life space,” which is the interdependent relationship
between the individual and her environment. Lewin’s “grand truism” is B=f(PE)—that is,
behavior is a function of the person and the environment. Jones, supra note 7, at 35.
9. This is not to say that we have no true identity, of course—just that we are not
completely stable, unchanging actors across contexts. The larger debate in psychology between
“situationism” and “dispositionism”—that is, between the importance of the environment and the
importance of individual characteristics—is robust and well beyond the scope of this short
Article.
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they are, regardless of what those things look like.10 This preference for the
status quo means that the way in which the law is structured may lead to
behavioral consequences. When the law creates certain endowments, those
endowments become a status quo from which individuals are reluctant to
depart.
So, for example, consider insurance. An Enlightenment devotee might
imagine—even one open to the potential influence of situational factors—that
risk preferences are one aspect of the self that would be more stable across
situations and less subject to manipulation by the governing legal regime.
Some people, this story would go, would be innately risk-seeking (sky-diving,
non-seatbelt wearing, motorcycle riding), while others would be innately riskaverse (seatbelt wearing, speed-limit obeying, helmet wearing). Take this
premise, and add to it a regime of required automobile insurance that offers
two options: one option provides more coverage for more money and the other
option provides less coverage for less money. Individuals are likely to have
some preference between these choices based on their orientation towards risk.
Those who prefer more risk would be likely to choose the limited coverage;
those who prefer less risk would be likely to choose comprehensive
coverage.11 Purely risk-neutral individuals would be likely to choose the
lower-cost option.
Now add to this premise two potential legal structures. In the first legal
structure, the state requires the buyer to purchase a basic level of insurance,
and allows the buyer to pay more for additional coverage. In the second, the
state asks the buyer to purchase a broader package of insurance, with an option
to decline a portion of the coverage and pay a lower price. In the first option,
the status quo is the basic insurance, and one can pay more for added coverage.
In the second option, the status quo is the comprehensive coverage, and one
can pay less for more limited coverage. In the world of the Enlightenment
self—the rational actor—individual choices should remain the same: those
with a high risk preference should still choose the limited coverage, those with
a low risk preference should still choose the more comprehensive plan, and
those with a neutral risk preference will choose the lowest-cost option.
Imagine two adjacent states, one of which offers its drivers the choices in the
first scenario and one of which offers its drivers the choices in the second
scenario. Unless people in one state are systematically more risk averse than

10. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion,
and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 197–99 (1991).
11. I do not mean to suggest that this fairly simplistic example explains or captures the
complex set of decisions involved in the selection of insurance. Issues of cost, resources, and
probabilities, to name a few, are surely likely to impact these decisions as well. See, e.g.,
Kahneman, supra note 10, at 199 (discussing a study of insurance policy choices in New Jersey
and Pennsylvania).
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people in another state, the percentage of people who choose the
comprehensive coverage versus the limited coverage should be roughly similar
in the different states, regardless of which plan the state presents as the default
option.
And yet research suggests that this is not the case. Eric Johnson and his
colleagues report that when drivers in Pennsylvania and New Jersey were
offered these two different plans, more drivers chose the comprehensive
coverage when it was the standard plan;12 more drivers chose, conversely, the
limited coverage when it was offered as the standard plan.13 Certainly, there
must have been drivers who would have chosen the same option in either
location, but there are also many individuals whose preferences appeared to be
largely shaped by the structure of the legal rule around insurance.14 Because
state laws mandate car insurance15 and may set a default option for drivers, the
nature of the default is likely to significantly affect the level of insurance
chosen and, consequently, how much money consumers pay into the insurance
system. The self is malleable in light of the legal regime, and the individual is
shaped by the law in ways that are often invisible to the self rather than
transparent.16
Because the law sets the status quo in many ways, it is important to
recognize the impact that status quo regulations may have on human
behavior.17 The structure of the law is not a neutral backdrop against which
people make decisions.18 If the architects of legal systems wish to encourage

12. Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, 7 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35, 48 (1993).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Automobile Insurance § 22 (2009).
16. The past decade has seen a vast increase in literature detailing ways in which these
decisional biases and heuristics affect individual behavior. See, e.g., DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY
IRRATIONAL, at i, xii (2008); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6–7 (Penguin Books 2009).
17. The status quo has important effects in the legal context even outside of the endowments
provided by law. For example, Russell Korobkin found that parties valued contract terms
differently depending on what was provided as the default term. Russell Korobkin, The Status
Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 639–41 (1998).
18. The Coase Theorem suggests that the legal endowments of a particular legal regime will
not matter to the ultimate outcome when people can bargain for optimal solutions and when
transaction costs are low or nonexistent. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. &
ECON. 1, 15 (1960). Indeed, in many cases it is transaction costs that are the problem, preventing
optimal resolutions. But in this and other cases, the transaction costs are low. Here, the
transaction costs when one must choose between options do not really differ very much. Instead,
it is something more fundamental that contravenes the Coase Theorem in this case: it is a change
in the way that individuals understand their choices, merely by virtue of which choice is the
default and which is the alternative. One might almost imagine that choosing the non-default
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or discourage certain types of behavior within a set of choices, changing the
structure of the law is an effective way to shift people’s decisions. In many
ways, the law does this implicitly, without a clear mandate from the people or
even the legislature. That is, it is not clear that constituents or legislators are
aware of the effects of the law’s endowments. When we assume that the law is
a non-actor, and that individuals have stable preferences, we may end up with
legal systems that shape human action in ways that we neither realize nor
explicitly condone. An understanding of the active role that legal rules can
play in shaping both preferences and behavior is an important step in ensuring
an optimal legal system.
II. TEMPORAL CONSTRUAL
The law assumes a unitary, stable actor whose preferences do not change
over time. Contract law, for instance, is predicated upon the stable preferences
of individuals.19 When entering into a contract, the present self binds the
future self to a course of action approved only by the present self. As a general
matter, we do not allow the future self, even if that self sees things differently,
to simply disavow the actions of the former self. The future self, in other
words, is bound to the terms of the contract negotiated by a different temporal
actor. The law of contracts supposes a world in which the preferences of the
present and future selves are identical, yet social science research has shown
that this is not the case. In particular, the present self is not able to accurately
forecast the preferences of the future self, leading to potential commitment
errors.
Part of this inaccuracy stems from the way that individuals think about
choices over time. Psychologists have suggested that temporal distance to a
future event changes the way in which individuals construe those events.20
Construal level theory, or CLT, proposes that people systematically think
differently about events in the near future versus events in the distant future.21
Specifically, individuals use “higher level construals” to think about events in
the distant future, and “lower level construals” when thinking about events in
the near future.22 Abstract features that capture the essential nature of an event
are considered “higher level construals,” whereas the concrete and specific
details of the events are considered “lower level construals.”23 Research

option adds psychological transaction costs because deviating from the status quo is difficult for
people.
19. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 219 (4th ed. 2004).
20. Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman, Temporal Construal, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 403, 405
(2003).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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suggests that individuals simply think differently about the same events when
they are located differentially in time.24
For example, in one psychological study, individuals given an activity such
as “locking the door” were asked to choose between alternative restatements of
that same activity, including the very concrete physical act of “putting a key in
the lock” and the far more conceptual goal of “securing the house.”25 When
the time frame for locking the door was tomorrow, individuals were more
likely to choose the restatement that described the concrete physical behavior;
when the time frame was sometime next year, individuals were more likely to
choose the abstract goal of the action.26 CLT’s supporting research suggests
that when people contemplate actions that are imminent, they think of all the
mundane, messy, everyday details, and when they contemplate actions in the
distant future, they distill them to their conceptual essence.27
CLT is applicable not just to descriptions of events but also to individual
preferences about future options. Near-future preferences are more complex
and harder to reduce to essential elements, whereas distant-future preferences
are more unified and cohesive.28 Consequently, psychologists have found that
when making decisions about events in the distant future, individuals focus on
the abstract properties of the decision, but in the short-term they tend to focus
on the most concrete terms.29 Time delay shifts the attractiveness of an option
towards its high-level construal, and near-future choices shift the attractiveness
towards the low-level construal.30 Additionally, primary aspects of options are
more important in the distant future, while secondary aspects of options play a
greater role in the near future.31 Finally, feasibility—the possibility that
something could happen—appears to be more of a secondary or low-level
construal, while desirability is a primary or high-level construal.32 So, for
example, in one experiment, individuals choosing which lectures to attend
chose the distant-future lecture according to topic, but chose the near-future
lecture according to timing.33 Participants likewise chose a distant-future
reading assignment based on interest level, but chose a near-future assignment
based on level of difficulty.34

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 406
Trope & Liberman, supra note 20, at 406.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 407.
Id.
Trope & Liberman, supra note 20, at 407.
Id. at 408.
Id. at 411.
Id.
Id.
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Similarly, consider the case of subjects in an experiment who were asked
to select a snack that they would have once a week for the next three weeks.35
Subjects reliably chose a variety of items to enjoy at snack time.36 But subjects
who were asked to pick their snacks each week did not pick a variety: they
reliably chose the same item each week.37 If one assumes that the present
self’s preferences are the “true” preferences, then those who chose snacks in
advance for the entire three-week period made an error. Why? It seems as
though when looking at “the whole picture,” more abstract attributes like
variety, diversity, and opportunity are more important in decision-making, but
when considering the immediate choice of what to actually eat, attributes like
chocolate, or crunchy, or cheesy (or perhaps merely “my favorite”) are more
important.
In a way, one might conceptualize the self here as stable: the preferences
remain the same for an individual, merely differing depending on the timing.
That is, we always want X for our present and Y for our future, regardless of
whether we’re asked in January or July, 1995 or 2010. But since we constantly
move forward in time, our present selves become our future selves all too soon,
and what our present self might want for its future incarnation clashes with
what that future incarnation does actually want. The Enlightenment’s vision of
the stable self cannot make sense of the individual whose preferences about the
very same options change merely due to temporal distance.
It is not possible to import these findings wholesale into the body of
contract law; there is no simple answer to explain how temporal construal
relates to every contract, or to contract law generally. Some contracts bind the
parties to take an action in the near future, while others bind parties for a
lengthier term, including both the near and the more distant future. Still other
contracts may bind parties only in the distant future. Because contracts are so
varied in their terms and conditions, relating temporal construal to contracting
behavior must be done on a more individualized basis. But this research is
clearly relevant to the ways that people think about their choices and their
commitments. People will perceive the features of contractual agreements
differently when they think about them in the near future versus the distant
future. When thinking about contract terms that describe actions that will
occur soon, contracting parties will focus on the details and the specifics. But
when thinking about contract terms that describe actions that will occur in the
distant future, they will focus on the abstract and broad-brush essentials.
Contract law pays little attention to this; instead, contract law largely pretends

35. Itamar Simonson, The Effect of Purchase Quantity and Timing on Variety-Seeking
Behavior, 27 J. MARKETING RES. 150, 153, 156 (1990).
36. Id. at 158.
37. Id. at 156.
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that individuals’ preferences are stable,38 perhaps because the alternative
would destabilize contract law irrevocably, potentially eliminating the benefits
of contracts altogether.
There are, however, several contract doctrines that address the problems of
shifting opportunities and preferences. In efficient breach, for example,
contract law allows parties to be released from their obligations if the
breaching party compensates the other party for his or her loss of goods or
services.39 Efficient breach allows people to take advantage of better, more
efficient market opportunities;40 the doctrine is not expressly meant to address
the party who simply changes his or her mind. In any event, a stable, rational
self would always prefer the choice with the highest market value, whether at
time period one or at time period two. In the efficient breach context, the
problem is that the self was not aware of the most efficient option at time
period one.
Nonetheless, the doctrine of efficient breach leaves room for changing
preferences to play an important role. The doctrine is conceptually broad
enough to encompass changing preferences that can be sufficiently monetized.
For example, suppose party A contracts to sell goods to party B, but then
changes her mind and decides she would derive greater utility from selling to
party C. Party A can efficiently breach and pay damages to party B if the
difference in utility between the sales (however Party A may define such
utility) is greater than the amount she will pay to B in damages.41
Similarly, the doctrine of contracts of adhesion relates to temporal
construal and potential changes in preference. Contracts of adhesion, which
are contracts of asymmetrical power, typically bind a small party to many
future terms that might be onerous for her.42 The onerous future terms are

38. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
39. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 133–34 (6th ed. 2003); Jody S.
Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603, 1637 (2009);
Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 629, 630 (1988).
40. See POSNER, supra note 39, at 133.
41. Perhaps because the doctrine of efficient breach is so neutral as to outcome, because it
merely privileges the outcome that provides the most utility, a number of commentators have
attacked it on moral grounds. See Kraus, supra note 39, at 1605–06; Seana V. Shiffrin, The
Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708, 730–32 (2007). Indeed, the use of
the doctrine to allow breach to be considered efficient merely when someone might prefer a
different outcome (thus deriving greater utility) brings up a grave concern with the stability of
contracts in an “efficient breach” world. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific
Performance, the Theory of Efficient Breach, and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93
CAL. L. REV. 975, 978 (2005).
42. Black’s Law Dictionary defines an “adhesion contract” as a standard form contract
“offered . . . on essentially ‘take it or leave it’ basis without affording consumer realistic
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probabilistic rather than certain, and the abstract, high-level construal of the
future terms of such a contract is more salient to the party than the concrete,
low-level construal of those terms.43 For example, the high-level construal of
enjoying a cruise preoccupies the contracting party, while the low-level
construal of the accelerated payment schedule, the required arbitration clause,
or even the high-interest monthly payments (not due for six months, perhaps)
fade. Legal safeguards designed to protect low-power consumers in these
settings are a way to protect people who are bedazzled by the present benefit
and may fail to accurately comprehend the future consequences.44
III. WHAT PEOPLE REALLY WANT
Finally, the vision of a fully self-aware, unitary, and stable self is belied by
a robust body of research suggesting that people are, simply put, not very good
at knowing what will make them happy. A host of research on happiness has
suggested that people are terrible predictors of how events will impact their
level of happiness—what researchers call “affective forecasting.”45
Individuals think that large-scale events, like winning the lottery, will make
them happy, but actual lottery winners report no higher level of happiness than
non-lottery winners.46 Similarly, negative events do not have the same longterm impact that most people expect them to have.47 Part of the reason that

opportunity to bargain and under such conditions that consumer cannot obtain desired product or
services except by acquiescing in form contract.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 40 (6th ed. 1990).
43. For another way of viewing contracts of adhesion that similarly relies on the difference
in salient features, see Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2003).
44. Similarly, courts have found certain contract terms unconscionable in ways that dovetail
with temporal construal. For example, the Fourth Circuit found that employment contract terms
were too one-sided in favor of the employer in Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933,
938–39 (4th Cir. 1999). In that case, one could imagine that when thinking about her
employment contract in the long-term, the employee was not focused on the concrete details of
who might make-up an arbitration panel if she became involved in a dispute with the company,
but rather on the larger conceptual element of having a steady job with a stable company.
45. For a review of this literature, see Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective
Forecasting, in 35 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 345, 353 (Mark P.
Zanna ed., 2003). Wilson and Gilbert describe the most common affective forecasting error, the
impact bias, as people’s tendency to “overestimate the impact of future events on their emotional
reactions.” Id.
46. Philip Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?,
36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917, 917 (1978). Similarly, although people predict that
others will be happier living in California than living in the Midwest because of the better
weather, people in both settings report similar levels of happiness. David A. Schkade & Daniel
Kahneman, Does Living in California Make People Happy? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of
Life Satisfaction, 9 PSYCHOL. SCI. 340, 342–43 (1998).
47. See, e.g., Eunkook Suh et al., Events and Subjective Well-Being: Only Recent Events
Matter, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1091, 1096 (1996).
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people are such poor predictors of happiness is that they are more adaptable to
circumstances—both positive and negative—than they realize.48 Indeed,
research in psychology suggests that people are tremendously adaptable to a
wide variety of changing circumstances, in ways that the law does not always
acknowledge or respect.49 For example, Samuel Bagenstos and Margo
Schlanger have suggested that “hedonic damages”—damages that compensate
for the loss of happiness—are misguided.50 Marshalling research that
documents the happiness of those with disabilities,51 they argue that when the
law allows recovery for this type of damages, the law actually may foster
unhappiness among disabled people by suggesting to them that their lives must
be wanting.52 The law, rather than acting neutrally, suggests to people what
the appropriate reaction is to their circumstances.53
The role of apology in litigation follows a similar course. Apologies have
been found to have important effects on parties: cases where apologies are
offered seem to settle more frequently,54 more quickly,55 and with lower
litigation costs.56 Claimants who have been offered an apology may change
their aspirations,57 and apologies help to preserve relationships and may even
forestall lawsuits.58 Yet lawyers are notoriously hostile to the idea of

48. For a discussion of this “psychological immune system,” see Daniel T. Gilbert et al.,
Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting, 75 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 617, 619 (1998).
49. Id.
50. Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and
Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745, 750 (2007).
51. Id. at 763–69.
52. Id. at 774 (“When courts uphold hedonic damages awards based on the view that
disabling injuries limit life’s enjoyment and keep plaintiffs from being a ‘whole person,’ they
entrench the societal view that disability is inherently tragic, and encourage people with
disabilities to see their lives as tragedies.”).
53. A number of legal scholars have recently considered the role that poor affective
forecasting may play in a variety of legal contexts. See, e.g., John Bronsteen et al., Happiness
and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1080 (2009); Scott A. Moss & Peter H. Huang, How
the New Economics Can Improve Employment Discrimination Law, and How Economics Can
Survive the Demise of the “Rational Actor,” 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 183, 216–17 (2009);
Jeffrey L. Harrison, Happiness, Efficiency, and the Promise of Decisional Equity: From Outcome
to Process, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 935, 935–36 (2009).
54. Chris S. Hyman & Clyde B. Schechter, Mediating Medical Malpractice Lawsuits
Against Hospitals: New York City’s Pilot Project, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1394, 1395 (2006).
55. Steve S. Kraman, A Risk Management Program Based on Full Disclosure and Trust:
Does Everyone Win?, 27 COMPREHENSIVE THERAPY 253, 254–55 (2001).
56. Id. at 255.
57. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement Levers, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
333, 342 (2006).
58. Kathleen M. Mazor et al., Health Plan Members’ Views about Disclosure of Medical
Errors, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 409, 413 (2004).
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apologies,59 and our legal system has traditionally discouraged apologies by
allowing apologies that include an admission of injury to be admissible as
evidence at trial.60 Indeed, Jennifer Robbennolt has found that the effects of
apologies on lawyers are almost the inverse of the effects on clients in some
respects: lawyers are largely indifferent to the emotional appeal of apologies,
and certain types of apologies tend to make lawyers raise, rather than lower,
their expectations about what they ought to receive in settlement.61 If what
injured people truly want—what will feel, to them, like real redress—includes
an apology from a wrongdoer, then our legal system, both its infrastructure and
its primary players, must rethink its approach to defining recompense through
money alone. And, in fact, a number of states have recently acted to encourage
apologies by making such statements inadmissible in court.62
In a related vein, research has suggested that people thinking about what
they want out of litigation or other dispute resolution processes may believe
that they want the most amount of money possible.63 After a dispute is
resolved, however, people report that they care a lot about the fairness of the
treatment—the procedural justice—that they received, sometimes even more
than the financial outcome.64 As with affective forecasting, individuals have
difficulty predicting what will make them feel satisfied with the resolution of a
dispute. Recent research has indicated that individuals even care about
procedural justice in dispute resolution settings without a third party, such as
negotiation.65 Although lawyers are accustomed to the procedural safeguards
that surround litigation, arbitration, and even mediation, they are not
necessarily fully aware of the effects of fairness in these settings, let alone in
even more informal dispute resolution processes. If parties truly value fairness
of process, either separate and apart from the monetary value of their
outcomes, or sometimes even more than the monetary value of their outcomes,
then it may be time to rethink the way that lawyers advise clients and resolve
cases in our legal system.
59. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation, 13 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 349, 353 (2008).
60. Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 819,
824 (2002) (stating that existing federal rules of evidence and analogous state provisions allow
apologies to be admitted to prove liability unless they are made during mediation or settlement
negotiations).
61. Id. at 376.
62. Id. at 356.
63. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler et al., The Two Psychologies of Conflict Resolution: Differing
Antecedents of Pre-Experience Choices and Post-Experience Evaluations, 2 GROUP PROCESSES
& INTERGROUP REL. 99, 114–15 (1999).
64. Id.
65. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation:
Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
473, 478 (2008).
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CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have identified just a handful of ways in which empirical
data help us understand the effect that the law and legal systems can have on
individuals, their preferences, and their behavior. The Enlightenment era
paved the way for the empirical data on human behavior that I have
highlighted here. And yet that same research fundamentally undermines the
Enlightenment vision of a stable, unitary, fully knowable self. Ironically, an
understanding of the way in which the law can effect change on individual
behavior belies the Enlightenment’s conception of the stable, unitary self. As
Professor powell urges, the project of the Enlightenment is not complete.
When these two titans of the Enlightenment clash, it is imperative that we
continue to explore and process the role of empirical data, rather than cling to
an outdated vision of the self, so that the law can better understand,
deliberately shape, or adequately respond to the realities of human behavior.

